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1  Introduction
Since the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the “NCA”)1 came into effect, 
the enforcement of consumer credit agreements has become subject to stricter 
control.2 The calling up of mortgage bonds is no exception, seeing that 
mortgage agreements qualify as credit agreements for purposes of the NCA.3 
The intention of this contribution is to investigate one specific debt relief 
mechanism that the NCA has introduced, namely the right to reinstate credit 
agreements.4 As with much of the NCA, the idea behind this right is to extend 
greater protection to credit consumers.5 Although full debt enforcement 
through litigation and the execution process can have detrimental consequences 
for debtors who default on their loans, reinstatement provides a way to prevent 
and even reverse debt enforcement – up to a certain point, at least – for those 
who can satisfy the requirements. As I aim to show, reinstatement has quite 
significant implications for debt enforcement, particularly in the mortgage 
context.
Reinstatement is provided for in section 129(3) and (4):
“(3) Subject to subsection (4), a consumer may –
(a)  at any time before the credit provider has cancelled the agreement re-instate a credit agreement 
that is in default by paying to the credit provider all amounts that are overdue, together with the 
credit provider’s permitted default charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up 
to the time of reinstatement; and –
(b)  after complying with paragraph (a), may resume possession of any property that had been 
repossessed by the credit provider pursuant to an attachment order.
* I am grateful to Prof AJ van der Walt for his valuable comments
1 All sections of legislation or regulations cited in this contribution refer to those of the NCA or its 
regulations, unless otherwise indicated
2 In general, see JW Scholtz, JM Otto, E van Zyl, CM van Heerden & N Campbell (eds) Guide to the 
National Credit Act (RS 3 2011); JM Otto & R-L Otto The National Credit Act Explained 2 ed (2010); CM 
van Heerden & JM Otto “Debt Enforcement in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2007) TSAR 
655
3 S 8(1)(b) read with s 8(4)(d)  See also Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2011 4 SA 508 (SCA) para 1  
4 For more details on how the NCA impacts mortgage foreclosure in general, see R Brits “Impact of 
the South African National Credit Act on the Enforcement of Mortgage Bonds” in B Akkermans & E 
Ramaekers (eds) Property Law Perspectives (2012) 85-106 and R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the 
Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act LLD thesis Stellenbosch (2012)
5 For the purposes of the NCA, see s 3
       
(4) A consumer may not re-instate a credit agreement after –
(a)  the sale of any property pursuant to –
 (i)  an attachment order; or
 (ii)  surrender of property in terms of section 127;
(b)  the execution of any other court order enforcing that agreement; or
(c)  the termination thereof in accordance with section 123.”
The NCA therefore provides a debtor who is in arrears with his or her credit 
agreement with the right to reinstate such an agreement by paying certain 
specific amounts before the agreement is cancelled.6 As I explain below, the 
restriction with regard to the timing of reinstatement (before cancellation) 
is problematic but not insurmountable. Accordingly, part 4 below analyses 
the exact time frame within which the debtor may exercise the right of 
reinstatement, since the NCA also provides some restrictions – especially 
in section 129(4). Reinstatement is effected by paying the three amounts 
mentioned in section 129(3), which amounts are investigated in part 5 below. 
An important issue that I explore is how reinstatement can be reconciled with 
the established principles of mortgage foreclosure and acceleration clauses.
It is pertinent for all the actors in the credit industry to pay attention to 
the debtor-in-default’s right to reinstate credit agreements and to learn what 
to expect. Debtors should seek to make use of this debt relief mechanism 
and creditors (especially mortgagees) should be aware of the effect that the 
right of reinstatement has on their position. Consequently, the purpose of this 
contribution is to set out the legislative framework of the right to reinstate and 
to analyse how this mechanism functions, with a particular focus on mortgage 
default.
2  Importance of reinstatement in the mortgage context
The enforcement of mortgage agreements (or the calling up of bonds) is 
commonly referred to in South African law as foreclosure. This remedy entails 
that, when the debtor defaults, the creditor is entitled to accelerate repayment 
of the full outstanding debt, which enables the creditor to obtain a judgment 
order for this amount. In addition, if the debtor is unable to immediately repay 
the full outstanding amount – which is typically the case – the creditor can 
apply for (and should generally be granted) an order declaring the mortgaged 
property specially executable. A sale in execution at a public auction usually 
follows in order to use the proceeds to settle the debt. The basic operation of 
this remedy is trite and it is invoked daily.7
A powerful element of foreclosure is the fact that the creditor can cancel the 
loan and reclaim the entire outstanding debt, regardless of the size of the actual 
6 S 129(3)(a)
7 In general, see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s the Law of Property 
5 ed (2006) 364 n 61 and 367-368; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 625; TJ Scott & S Scott Wille’s 
Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3 ed (1987) 203-251  Case law that confirms these basic 
principles include FirstRand Bank Ltd v Soni 2008 4 SA 71 (N) para 22; The Master v IL Back & Co Ltd 
1983 1 SA 986 (A) 1004; Western Bank Ltd v SJJ Van Vuuren Transport (Pty) Ltd 1980 2 SA 348 (T) 351; 
TG Bradfield Coastal Properties (Pty) Ltd v Toogood 1977 2 SA 724 (EC) 730; Moodley v Community 
Development Board 1968 4 SA 615 (D) 619; Thirlwell v Johannesburg Building Society 1962 4 SA 581 
(N) 583  
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default. This state of affairs is in accordance with the well-known principles 
of foreclosure and with the acceleration clause that mortgage agreements 
typically include.8 Therefore, the result is that a debtor who falls in arrears 
with his or her monthly repayment instalments will be liable to repay the 
entire debt in the event that the creditor decides to foreclose and hence to 
enforce its real security right of mortgage. Traditionally, after foreclosure 
(in other words, after the creditor has elected to accelerate repayment of the 
debt and call up the bond), even if the actual amounts outstanding are very 
small or subsequently brought up to date, foreclosure will not be reversed. For 
example, in Boland Bank Ltd v Pienaar9 the creditor’s right to accelerate was 
upheld despite the debtor’s ability and willingness to purge the default – the 
mortgagee was entitled to refuse to accept late payment. The more recent 
decision in Nedbank Ltd v Fraser10 (“Fraser”) also confirms the traditional 
common law approach, namely that the creditor may in principle accelerate 
repayment of the full outstanding debt, even if the default is insignificant 
or can subsequently be purged.11 As the court in ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane12 
(“Ntsane”) acknowledged, the bank’s election to accelerate payment of the 
debt (which is based on a right afforded in terms of the mortgage bond) can 
hardly be regarded as unlawful, even if the default that triggered it is very 
small.13
Under the common law, the only way to escape the full effects of foreclosure 
(namely, sale in execution of the mortgaged property) is to make use of the 
right of redemption.14 For this right to be invoked the debtor must pay the 
full outstanding debt, which frees the property from the limited real right of 
mortgage and redeems the attached property, even after it has been sold in 
execution (but not after it has been transferred by registration to the auction 
purchaser). It is not difficult to perceive that the right of redemption does 
not provide much relief for the debtor who is unable to pay the outstanding 
judgment debt. Although this option remains available for those who can 
accumulate the necessary funds, it is of little practical use for those who 
cannot. Only getting the amounts in arrears up to date is not enough to call 
upon the debtor’s right of redemption, and consequently foreclosure can go 
ahead. Many a merciful creditor might be content with not proceeding with 
foreclosure if the debtor simply gets the arrears up to date, but the common 
law provides for no legal obligation to do so.
The potential harshness of this legal position is quite evident if one 
considers the drastic effects that full foreclosure can have on debtors. It is 
8 Badenhorst et al Property 364 n 61 and 367-368; Van der Merwe Sakereg 625  
9 1988 3 SA 618 (A)  
10 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) para 36
11 See also TG Bradfield Coastal Properties (Pty) Ltd v Toogood 1977 2 SA 724 (EC) 730, where it was held 
that even the creditor itself cannot reverse its election to foreclose  I doubt whether this approach will be 
followed or even argued today
12 2007 3 SA 554 (T) para 68
13 The court nevertheless refused to allow acceleration and foreclosure in this case, since it regarded 
the bank’s decision to foreclose as abusive and a violation of the debtors’ rights in terms of s 26 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”)  See part 5 2 below
14 In general, see Badenhorst et al Property 381; Scott & Scott Mortgage and Pledge 191-195 and the sources 
cited there
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not for nothing that there has been controversy regarding the constitutional 
implications in cases where mortgage debtors face eviction from their homes. 
Sales in execution of residential property can have dire socio-economic results 
and the general approach that has developed requires a fair and proportionate 
outcome also in mortgage foreclosure cases. Broadly speaking, the attitude 
of the courts is that the home should only be sold if there are no other options 
available to settle the dispute.15 To still insist on sale in execution under 
circumstances where the arrears had been paid up, with the loss of home 
imminent, is hardly likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. There is simply no 
justification to sell the home (and violate section 26 of the Constitution)16 if 
the loan repayment schedule is brought up to date. The bank’s purpose – debt 
enforcement – and security interest will seldom still be under threat, especially 
when compared to the importance that the Constitution attaches to homes. 
Despite the possible constitutional problems, it has not been necessary for the 
courts to develop the strict common law position with respect to foreclosure. 
Instead, the legislature has stepped in with the NCA, which goes a long way to 
protect credit consumers who face the sale in execution of their properties,17 
at least in those respects where the traditional foreclosure principles might 
not do so.
3  What is the effect of reinstatement?
3 1  Resume possession of property
Before explaining the requirements for and qualifications of the right 
to reinstatement, it is necessary to first describe the consequences that 
reinstatement will have in cases where it is successfully utilised. Part 2 
above explains that foreclosure will usually have the effect that the mortgage 
agreement is cancelled and payment of the entire outstanding debt enforced 
by selling the mortgaged property in execution. Moreover, under the common 
law the bank has the right to refuse to accept late payment of the amounts 
in arrears. Only the repayment of the full outstanding debt would save the 
debtor’s property. However, by successfully making use of the right of 
reinstatement the debtor now has a way to escape the full consequences of 
15 Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 608 (CC) paras 53 and 54  The entire controversy is analysed 
in Brits Mortgage Foreclosure 60-137  See also AJ van der Walt & R Brits “The Purpose of Judicial 
Oversight over the Sale in Execution of Mortgaged Property: Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 
608 (CC); Nedbank Ltd v Fraser and Four Other Cases 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ)” (2012) 75 THRHR 322
16 S 26 of the Constitution:
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances  No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions ”
17 See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales 2009 3 SA 315 (D) para 59:
“Every effort should be made to find creative alternatives which allow for debt recovery but which use 
execution only as a last resort  Even though the defendants in the present matter put up the property 
as security for the indebtedness to the plaintiff under the mortgage bond, the [NCA] has nevertheless 
given them the opportunity to utilise its provisions to avoid execution in suitable circumstances ” 
(Emphasis added)
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foreclosure by only paying the amounts outstanding (plus the other amounts 
required by section 129(3)).
Section 129(3)(b) provides that successful reinstatement entitles the debtor 
to “resume possession of any property that had been repossessed by the credit 
provider pursuant to an attachment order”. Although a term like “repossessed” 
is not perfectly suited for the mortgage foreclosure context, there is no reason 
to believe that the same principle should not apply where a mortgaged property 
has been attached pursuant to a writ of execution.18 If a mortgage agreement 
can be reinstated even after judgment had been granted and the hypothecated 
property attached,19 the logical implication is that the attachment must fall 
away at the point of reinstatement. If the mortgage agreement is reinstated, it 
makes no sense to have the sale in execution go ahead.
If the requirements of the NCA are fulfilled, the credit agreement will 
consequently be fully reinstated and continue to operate as if there had never 
been any default. If the debtor was to default again, the debt enforcement 
procedures of the NCA would have to be complied with again. That is, the 
notice of default20 must be sent once more. The only exception to this principle 
is when the debtor falls in arrears with a rearranged payment plan, in which 
case another notice of default is not necessary.21 In all other cases, it seems like 
reinstatement can occur over and over again. All enforcement proceedings 
will be overturned each time that the debtor rectifies the default. Although this 
position may cause administrative difficulties for some creditors, the NCA 
clearly places no restriction on the number of times a debtor can reinstate the 
agreement by getting the relevant amounts paid up. However, debtors should 
in my opinion not be allowed to abuse the right of reinstatement, for which 
abuse there would have to be proper proof.22
3 2  Unilateral and automatic
Is reinstatement a unilateral juristic action taken by the debtor or must he 
or she first consult with the creditor? In other words, is physical repayment 
of the amounts outstanding enough to fully reinstate the credit agreement 
and prevent and overturn any enforcement action being commenced by the 
creditor, even if the creditor is unaware of payments being brought up to 
date? It was argued in Nedbank Ltd v Barnard23 that a debtor who wants to 
reinstate his or her credit agreement must first approach the creditor to obtain 
information regarding the extent of his or her default. Moreover, it was argued 
18 See also H Coetzee “Voluntary Surrender, Repossession and Reinstatement in terms of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2010) 73 THRHR 569 578
19 Whether reinstatement is indeed possible after judgment and/or attachment is discussed in parts 4 2 and 
4 3 below
20 S 129(1)(a) of the NCA
21 S 88(3)(b)(ii)  However, see part 3 3 below
22 For example, a creditor who is frustrated with the debtor’s repeated default and reinstatement might 
want to argue that the debtor is abusing his or her right of reinstatement (if this motive can indeed be 
proven)  However, the fact that the creditor may claim default charges (see part 5 1 below) should mostly 
compensate for creditors’ frustrations in this regard
23 (1142/08) 2009 ZAECPEHC 45 (1 September 2009) SAFLII para 14 <http://www saflii org/za/cases/
ZAECPEHC/2009/45 html> (accessed 10-08-2012)
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that the debtor must inform the creditor of his or her intention to reinstate the 
credit agreement. Consequently, the contention was that the credit agreement 
cannot be regarded as being automatically reinstated when the debtor simply 
purges the default.24 However, the court rejected this argument, since there 
is nothing in the NCA that requires the parties to consult with each other 
before reinstatement.25 In other words, the debtor can unilaterally reinstate the 
agreement by paying the amount in arrears as well as the permitted charges. 
Reinstatement occurs automatically once the required amounts are paid.26 
There is no reason to doubt the correctness of this decision, seeing that nothing 
in the NCA seems to indicate otherwise. Banks are accordingly advised 
to structure their systems in such a way that they take accurate account of 
outstanding amounts being repaid, so that enforcement proceedings are not 
instituted (or continued) despite reinstatement already having taken place.
3 3  Purging arrears under a rearranged payment plan
Debt rearrangement is one of the debt relief mechanisms that the NCA 
provides for those who are over-indebted.27 For current purposes I do not go 
into the details of debt rearrangement.28 To summarise, as part of the debt 
review process, the parties can agree to a rearranged payment plan or a court 
can grant an order to that effect. For example, the amount of the monthly 
instalments can be decreased and combined with a longer repayment period.29 
Therefore, rearrangement is a way to assist debtors who have fallen in arrears 
with (or who are about to default on) their credit agreements. Also, debt 
review prevents enforcement of the debt (including foreclosure).30 However, if 
the debtor also falls in arrears with the rearranged payment plan, normal debt 
enforcement can take its course.31
Consequently, the right of reinstatement is qualified under circumstances 
where the consumer’s obligations have been rearranged, when he or she 
defaulted on such a repayment plan, and subsequently brought those arrears 
up to date. In other words, debt rearrangement will fall away if the debtor is in 
default with the credit agreement as well as the rearranged payment plan.32 If 
the amount that the debt rearrangement plan is in arrears with is purged, the 
rearranged payment scheme will not be reinstated and debt enforcement can 
24 Para 14
25 Para 15
26 Para 15  See also Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 
November 2011) SAFLII para 34 n 35 <http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAECELLC/2011/13 html> 
(accessed 10-08-2012)
27 Ss 86 and 87 of the NCA
28 In general, see Otto & Otto National Credit Act 58-64; C van Heerden “Over-Indebtedness and Reckless 
Credit” in JW Scholtz, JM Otto, E van Zyl, CM van Heerden & N Campbell (eds) Guide to the National 
Credit Act (RS 3 2011) 11–5-11–24
29 S 86(7)(c)(ii)(aa) of the NCA
30 S 88(3)
31 S 88(3)(b)(ii)  See also FirstRand Bank Ltd v Fillis 2010 6 SA 565 (ECP) paras 14-16  
32 S 88(3)(a)-(b) of the NCA
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therefore continue.33 Only the purging of the amount that the original credit 
agreement is in arrears with will lead to reinstatement. Nevertheless, it seems 
that courts may be willing to refuse to grant summary judgment against a 
debtor who is willing and able to comply with the rearranged payment plan, 
despite his or her momentary (but purged) default in terms of such a plan.34
4  When can a credit agreement be reinstated?
4 1  before debt enforcement proceedings commences: 
Section 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd)
To reinstate a credit agreement, the debtor in default must pay certain 
amounts, which are analysed in part 5 below. I firstly investigate when 
reinstatement is possible. Although section 129(3) and (4) is the main 
provision regarding the right of reinstatement, I first refer to another provision 
that establishes a point of departure for explaining what happens when default 
is purged. Section 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd) provides as follows:
“(3) Despite any provision of law or contract to the contrary, in any proceedings commenced in a 
court in respect of a credit agreement to which this Act applies, the court may determine the matter 
only if the court is satisfied … –
(c)  that the credit provider has not approached the court –
 (ii)  despite the consumer having –
  (dd)   brought the payments under the credit agreement up to date, as contemplated in section 
129(1)(a).”
This provision applies if the amounts in question are brought up to date 
before any debt enforcement proceedings have been “commenced in a court”. 
In such a case the creditor would not be able to enforce through litigation its 
decision to cancel the credit agreement. Foreclosure action would be prevented 
despite the bank’s decision to call up the bond. The force of this provision is 
emphasised by the fact that it applies “[d]espite any provision of law or contract 
to the contrary”. In other words, the benefits of this section can be neither 
waived through agreement nor limited by a provision of statutory or common 
law. When a bank therefore wishes to foreclose on a bond under circumstances 
where the debtor has defaulted on the loan, it would be prevented from taking 
legal action to do so if the debtor rectified the default before court proceedings 
commence. According to subparagraph (dd), the default that should have been 
purged is the one that had been disclosed to the debtor in the section 129(1)(a)35 
notice of default. However, section 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd) says nothing about what 
33 FirstRand Bank Ltd formerly known as First National Bank of Southern African Ltd v Fester 
(14597/2011) 2011 ZAWCHC 363 (15 September 2011) SAFLII para 4 <http://www saflii org/za/cases/
ZAWCHC/2011/363 html> (accessed 10-08-2012), citing and quoting from FirstRand Bank Ltd v Fillis 
2010 6 SA 565 (ECP) paras 14-16
34 FirstRand Bank Ltd v Britz (5243/2011) 2012 ZAFSHC 13 (9 February 2012) SAFLII paras 22 and 26 
<http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAFSHC/2012/13 html> (accessed 10-08-2012)
35 S 129(1)(a) of the NCA:
“(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider –
   (a)  may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose that the consumer refer 
the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or 
ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties resolve any dispute under the agreement 
or develop and agree on a plan to bring the payments under the agreement up to date ”
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happens when arrears are paid up after debt enforcement proceedings have been 
commenced but not yet completed, or have been completed but not yet executed. 
I address these questions in the following parts.
4 2  before the agreement is cancelled
4 2 1  Contradictions in section 129(3)
As with many of the NCA’s provisions, drafting oddities and uncertainties 
also occur with regard to the topic at hand. Nonetheless, it is important to try 
and make sense of the provisions, with reference to their purposes as well 
as those of the NCA as a whole. The potentially awkward aspect of section 
129(3)(a) – quoted in part 1 above – is the fact that the debtor in default may 
only reinstate the credit agreement before it has been cancelled. In addition, 
section 129(3)(b) implies that reinstatement should be possible after the 
property that is subject to the credit agreement has been attached as part of the 
debt enforcement process. Otto comments on this contradiction as follows:
“It escapes my mind how, first, an agreement which has not been cancelled can be reinstated. 
Secondly, it is not clear how a person can resume possession of a thing which has been repossessed 
pursuant to an attachment order, if the agreement was not cancelled to justify such an attachment 
order in the first place.”36
As a result, a literal reading of the subsection may render its practical 
application quite restrictive or even unworkable. From section 130(3)(c)(ii)
(dd) – discussed in part 4 1 above – it is clear that debt enforcement (and 
foreclosure) will be prevented if the amounts outstanding are repaid before 
litigation commences. Since that section refers to purging the arrears before 
debt enforcement is commenced, “reinstatement” is not truly what happens 
in that instance because, as Otto rightly points out, one cannot reinstate an 
agreement that has not been cancelled.37 Rather, the right of reinstatement 
(revealed in section 129(3) and (4)) seems to apply to a later stage – potentially 
during or even after conclusion of debt enforcement litigation. Logically, 
reinstatement should apply after cancellation or at least after the cancellation 
process has been set in motion. Yet, the literal wording of section 129(3)(a) 
restricts reinstatement to before cancellation.
In light of the fact that section 129(3)(b) contradicts section 129(3)(a) by 
expressly allowing reinstatement after cancellation (when the property has 
been attached), the question should be asked: what is meant by “before the 
credit provider has cancelled the agreement” in section 129(3)(a)? The literal 
meaning of section 129(3)(a) seems to imply that the debtor is allowed to 
only prevent cancellation by getting the arrears up to date before the creditor 
decides to take action and cancel the agreement. However, this interpretation 
would not allow the debtor to reinstate the agreement after the creditor has 
already taken the necessary steps to lawfully cancel the agreement. Also, 
recovering possession of the attached property (as section 129(3)(b) provides 
36 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained (2006) 98, similarly repeated in Otto & Otto National Credit 
Act 117 (original emphasis)
37 Otto National Credit Act 98; Otto & Otto National Credit Act 117
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for) would then never be possible, since the creditor would only ever repossess 
the property in terms of an attachment order after cancellation. Therefore, 
section 129(3)(b) would have no meaning, which could hardly have been the 
legislature’s intention. In terms of this paragraph it is clear that reinstatement 
would have to be possible after the property had been attached in terms of an 
attachment order, which can only occur after and not before cancellation.38 
Yet, if reinstatement is only possible before cancellation (as section 123(3)(a) 
states), the word “reinstatement”, as Otto explains, would be “a misnomer”39 
because it would not be the correct term to describe the mechanism. This 
interpretation would also render section 129(3) rather pointless, since it 
is obvious that debt enforcement can be prevented by getting the arrears 
up to date. Section 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd) and the mandatory notice-of-default 
requirement of section 129(1)(a) already provide as much.
Therefore, the literal interpretation of section 129(3)(a) would render section 
129(3)(b) without effect. In my view, the only way to sensibly interpret section 
129(3) so that both paragraphs (a) and (b) would have a function is to assume 
that the concept “cancelled” in paragraph (a) has a broader (and rather loose) 
meaning here. For reinstatement to have any substantive effect, one would 
have to give more weight to the other provisions that regulate this mechanism 
and not stumble over the unclear before-cancellation requirement in section 
129(3)(a). I suspect that the legislature’s intention with the before-cancellation 
qualification in section 129(3)(a) was to ensure that reinstatement would not 
be possible after the whole debt enforcement process has been completed, 
since such an approach would clearly be unsustainable. Hence, one should 
not read the term “cancelled” too technically here. Other provisions like 
sections 129(3)(b) and 129(4)40 clearly envision a wider scope for the right of 
reinstatement than the restriction implied by section 129(3)(a).
38 Otto National Credit Act 98; Otto & Otto National Credit Act 117  See also Coetzee (2010) THRHR 578  
A possibility, as Coetzee (578) suggests, is that:
“[Section 129(3)(a)] had the situation in mind where the consumer brings his or her payments up to date 
in general, or under circumstances where the credit provider already acquired the right to cancel the 
agreement, but has not yet exercised such right ”
However, she also acknowledges (578-579) that s 129(3)(b) (reinstatement after attachment) makes her 
suggested interpretation problematic, unless s 129(3)(b) had the situation in mind where the property 
had been attached prior to cancellation – that is, in terms of a so-called interim attachment order to 
ensure the temporary safekeeping of goods pending debt enforcement action being instituted  However, 
it is not settled that such an attachment is at all possible under the NCA, at least not as a part of the debt 
enforcement process: See Otto & Otto National Credit Act 112-113; JM Otto “Attachment of Goods Sold 
in terms of Instalment Agreement Without Cancellation of Contract – Sanctioned by the National Credit 
Act? Absa Bank Ltd v De Villiers unreported case no 15692/07 (C)” (2009) 72 THRHR 473 477-479  Even 
if courts would be willing under the NCA to grant interim attachment orders to keep goods safe pending 
cancellation (which was not uncommon pre-NCA and moreover necessary under certain circumstances: 
See Otto (2009) THRHR 477-479), the interim attachment of immovable property to keep it safe for future 
foreclosure is not known (or necessary) in South African law
39 Otto National Credit Act 98 n 135, repeated in Otto & Otto National Credit Act 116 n 165
40 See part 4 3 below
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4 2 2  The cancellation of a credit agreement for purposes of section 
129(3)
In general, the cancellation of a contract can be defined as “a unilateral 
juristic act which terminates certain consequences of a valid contract”.41 The 
power to cancel a contract is derived from an ex lege contractual term that 
comes into effect when the contract is breached.42 However, cancellation 
as a remedy is only available if the breach is material or serious, or if the 
contract provides for a right to cancel;43 the classical lex commissoria. Credit 
agreements that are repaid in a number of instalments habitually provide for 
cancellation in the form of acceleration clauses. The agreement may also 
include certain requirements for cancellation – for instance, that the creditor 
must first give notice of the breach (default) and allow the debtor to rectify it 
within a certain time. Therefore, cancellation is a legal action that occurs prior 
to (and provides the basis for) enforcement through litigation and execution.
For credit agreements that fall under the ambit of the NCA, cancellation 
may not take place before the creditor has provided a notice of default in 
terms of section 129(1)(a) and the debtor either rejects the proposals made or 
fails to respond within the required time period.44 (As mentioned in part 4 1 
above, rectifying the default within this period must necessarily prevent 
cancellation.) The sending of the notice is also regarded as a first step to 
enforce (cancel) the credit agreement.45 Furthermore, a creditor must comply 
with section 123 in order to “terminate” a credit agreement before the time 
provided in that agreement.46 Accordingly, when a debtor is in default, the 
creditor may only “enforce and terminate” the agreement in terms of Part C of 
Chapter 6 of the NCA,47 which refers to sections 129 to 133. Although neither 
“termination” nor “cancellation” is defined in the NCA, it is rather apparent 
that these concepts refer to the same thing. Therefore, to enforce or cancel/
terminate a credit agreement when the debtor is in default, the creditor must 
follow the requirements of especially sections 129 and 130. This contribution 
does not concern the details of what sections 129 and 130 require for a 
valid cancellation/termination,48 but the conclusion that I draw for current 
purposes is that to cancel/terminate a credit agreement entails a process of 
following various requirements (for instance, the notice of default and time 
periods, with the possibility of debt review intervening). Therefore, a credit 
agreement is not regarded as being fully “cancelled” or “terminated” before 
the debt enforcement process has been completed in terms of sections 129 
and 130 of the NCA. Of course, these sections contain all the provisions that 




44 S 130(1) of the NCA
45 C van Heerden “Enforcement of Credit Agreements” in JW Scholtz, JM Otto, E van Zyl, CM van Heerden 
& N Campbell (eds) Guide to the National Credit Act (RS 3 2011) 12–9
46 S 123(1) of the NCA
47 S 123(2)
48 In general, see Otto & Otto National Credit Act 98-117; Van Heerden “Enforcement of Credit Agreements” 
in Guide to the NCA ch 12; Van Heerden & Otto (2007) TSAR 655
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afford the right to reinstate, which implies that the right to a valid cancellation 
(and enforcement through litigation) of a credit agreement is qualified by the 
debtor’s right of reinstatement. I elaborate on the enforcement aspect below.
4 3  Qualifications in terms of section 129(4)
4 3 1  Until judgment is executed or property sold
Section 129(3) is expressly made subject to section 129(4) and it would 
therefore not make sense if section 129(3) was interpreted more restrictively 
than the manner in which it is qualified by section 129(4). In fact, the 
section 129(4) qualifications should by and large be regarded as the boundaries 
for debtors’ rights under section 129(3) to reinstate credit agreements that 
are in default. Under section 129(4), reinstatement is only prohibited after the 
attached or surrendered property has been sold; a court order that enforces 
the agreement has been executed; or the agreement has been terminated 
(cancelled) in terms of section 123.
The court in Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd49 (“Dwenga”) pointed out 
(obiter) that reinstatement should only be possible until judgment is granted 
because the agreement is terminated at that point. Yet, this interpretation is 
inconsistent with section 129(4)(a) and (b), which allows reinstatement until 
the judgment is executed or the property sold – therefore, after judgment had 
been granted. It is unfortunate that section 129(4) also appears to have some 
internal inconsistencies, especially between paragraphs (a) and (b) on the one 
hand and paragraph (c) on the other. Paragraph (c) prohibits reinstatement 
when the agreement had been terminated in terms of section 123, whereas 
paragraphs (a) and (b) prohibit reinstatement after the attached (or surrendered) 
property is sold or the judgment is executed. Since paragraphs (a), (b) and 
(c) are separated by the word “or”, they should be read as alternatives and 
therefore any of these events will prohibit reinstatement.
If termination refers to the moment that judgment is granted, the court in 
Dwenga was correct to state that reinstatement cannot occur after judgment 
is granted, since this would be the point that section 129(4)(c)’s restriction 
on reinstatement is triggered. However, this interpretation of paragraph (c) 
would render paragraphs (a) and (b) meaningless, since both of those events 
occur after judgment had been granted (except paragraph (a)(ii)). In my view, 
paragraph (c) should not be interpreted to refer to the granting of judgment 
as such. Rather, for paragraphs (a) and (b) to have any meaning whatsoever, 
“termination” in paragraph (c) should be given a wider meaning that includes 
execution of the judgment. Be that as it may, despite the unclear drafting of 
section 129(4), I suggest that it should be construed so that reinstatement is 
only prohibited once the judgment had been enforced or the property sold 
(paragraphs (a) and (b)), which may often refer to the same event. The purpose 
of paragraph (c) would then probably be to cover instances of termination not 
49 (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) SAFLII para 35 n 36
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covered by paragraphs (a) and (b) – for example, credit agreements that do not 
concern the purchase or possession of property.
4 3 2  Until property is sold but not until transferred
Another question that needs to be addressed is whether the agreement can 
be reinstated even after the property that is subject to the credit agreement (for 
example, a mortgaged home) has been sold in execution but not yet transferred 
to the auction purchaser. Section 129(4)(a) only restricts reinstatement after 
sale but does not say whether transfer of ownership is included. The court 
in Fraser held that this was indeed the case: “sale” includes the conclusion 
of the sale agreement at the auction as well as transfer of ownership by way 
of registration (in the case if immovables).50 Accordingly, reinstatement will 
cause the auction sale to fail if the property has not been transferred yet.
The reason for the approach that was supported by Fraser is that the 
common law right of redemption (which the court regarded as analogous 
to reinstatement) functions in this way as well.51 Under the common law 
an auction purchaser buys the property subject to the debtor’s right of 
redemption and the court argued that the same should apply when it comes 
to reinstatement under the NCA.52 Logically, there appears to be no reason to 
restrict the scope of reinstatement to provide lesser relief than the common 
law right of redemption. Given that the purpose of sale in execution arguably 
falls away when the mortgage default is purged, the implication is that the sale 
would have to fail unless registration has already taken place. Section 129(4)
(a)(i)’s qualification on reinstatement was consequently interpreted broadly so 
as to include both sale and transfer of the attached property.
However, the court in Dwenga did not agree and held that the opportunity 
to make use of reinstatement ends even before the sale is concluded at the 
auction, namely at the point of judgment being granted.53 As explained in part 
4 3 1 above, this approach is unlikely to be correct. However, no opinion was 
expressed in Dwenga with regard to whether Fraser was correct in finding 
that “sale” in section 129(4)(a) also includes transfer by registration. Seeing as 
section 129(4)(a) does not expressly give this wide meaning to “sale”, Fraser’s 
accommodating interpretation might be incorrect – also if one takes practical 
considerations into account.
To interpret the provisions in the NCA that govern the scope of the right 
of reinstatement it might make sense to draw from the established principles 
that govern the common law right of redemption. However, the comparison 
can only go so far, since reinstatement must also be interpreted as a 
separate and new legislative measure and not as an extension of the right of 
redemption. Moreover, reinstatement must be construed to make practical 
sense. The fact is that, despite the similarities that can be drawn between the 
50 Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) para 40
51 Paras 40-41
52 Para 40
53 Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) SAFLII 
para 35 n 36
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two mechanisms, reinstatement and redemption differ notably. The court in 
Dwenga may therefore have been correct in questioning the interpretation 
given to reinstatement by Fraser, at least on this point (on other issues I agree 
with Fraser, as explained in part 5 4 below).
One can envision the uncertainty that would ensue in practice if auction 
sales were to be regarded as subordinate to the possibility of reinstatement 
until the point of registration. It would mean that auction sales will fail each 
time a debtor gets all outstanding amounts up to date prior to registration. 
With regard to redemption, this is not a problem because the possibility of 
redemption is so low and therefore there is virtually no material risk for 
persons who purchase immovable property at auctions. On the other hand, the 
possibility of reinstatement could be quite high, depending on how low the 
outstanding amounts are. Therefore, to allow reinstatement to occur after sale 
but prior to registration would render auction sales very insecure (and hence 
unpopular) and would cause great inconvenience for auction purchasers as 
well as the deeds registration system. The public auction process would not be 
able to fulfil its debt recovery function properly. Also, lower sale prices (which 
will, no doubt, accompany the high risk of sales failing due to reinstatement) 
will in return prejudice debtors, which is contrary to the NCA’s core purposes.
Conversely, this detriment to the practical functioning of the public-
auction process may be outweighed by the benefit that reinstatement entails 
for homeowners who wish to save their homes, even after the auction but 
before registration. One may therefore lean towards allowing reinstatement 
after the auction sale but prior to registration if this interpretation of section 
129(4)(a) promotes the spirit, purport and objects of section 26 of the Bill of 
Rights.54 Yet, a more restrictive interpretation might also be allowed if it can 
be justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution, which may be the 
case if the public auction process is to be protected and encouraged for the 
undoubtedly important public purpose that it serves. The alternative might be 
an amendment of the public auction system to provide for reinstatement post-
sale within its structures. In other words, if reinstatement is possible until 
the point of registration, the auction sale process would have to be adapted 
to ensure that auction purchasers are alerted to this qualification on their sale 
agreements. Moreover, the instabilities that this approach will cause would 
have to be counterbalanced in some way that will keep public auctions’ 
integrity intact.
Since no final position has been taken by a higher court, I put forward 
that section 129(4)(a) should be interpreted wider than what was proposed 
in Dwenga but somewhat narrower that what was decided in Fraser. 
Reinstatement is not prohibited from the moment of judgment being granted 
but is also not allowed beyond the sale concluded at the public auction (or the 
enforcement of judgment in some other way). Hence, the concept “sale” in 
section 129(4)(a) is limited to the conclusion of the auction sale and does not 
include transfer by registration. As Coetzee correctly concludes, “sale of the 
54 S 39(2) of the Constitution requires that legislation must be interpreted in this manner
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property marks the final point of no return for the consumer” who wished to 
reinstate his or her credit agreement.55
5  How are credit agreements reinstated
5 1  The amounts payable
Above I analysed when reinstatement can take place. Despite unclear 
drafting, I arrived at some conclusions that are defensible in my view. This 
part analyses how reinstatement takes place. Section 130(3) simply states 
that debt enforcement litigation will be prevented by bringing the payments 
under the credit agreement up to date. To know which payments will achieve 
reinstatement, one must refer to section 129(3)(a), which requires the payment 
of three amounts to successfully reinstate a credit agreement: (1) All overdue 
amounts; (2) default charges (or “default administration charges” as defined 
in the Act); and (3) enforcement costs (or “collection costs” as defined in the 
Act). After briefly dealing with the second and third amounts, I consider the 
first one – the more important amount – in more detail.
Default administration charges (default charges) “may be imposed by a 
credit provider to cover administration costs incurred as a result of a consumer 
defaulting on an obligation under a credit agreement”.56 Default charges may 
not exceed the maximum prescribed by the National Credit Regulations.57 
Therefore, default charges may be charged for each letter written necessary 
for the enforcement of the debt in terms of Part C of Chapter 6 of the NCA. 
This amount may not surpass the amount payable for a registered letter of 
demand in undefended actions in terms of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 
1944 plus necessary and reasonable expenses to deliver these letters.58
Collection (enforcement) costs “may be charged by a credit provider in 
respect of enforcement of a consumer’s monetary obligations under a credit 
agreement, but does not include a default administration charge”.59 This 
amount may not be more than the maximum prescribed by regulation and 
may be charged only to the degree permitted by Part C of Chapter 6.60 The 
relevant regulation provides as follows:
“For all categories of credit agreement, collection costs may not exceed the costs incurred by the 
credit provider in collecting the debt –
(a)  to the extent limited by Part C of Chapter 6 of the Act, and
(b)  in terms of –
 (i)  the Supreme Court Act, 1959,
 (ii)  the Magistrates’ Court Act, 1944,
 (iii) the Attorneys Act, 1979; or
 (iv) the Debt Collector’s Act, 1998,
which ever is applicable to the enforcement of the credit agreement.”61
55 Coetzee (2010) THRHR 581
56 S 1 of the NCA sub verbo “default administration charge”
57 S 101(1)(f)(i) of the NCA
58 Reg 46  See GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31-05-2006  
59 S 1 of the NCA sub verbo “collection costs”  
60 S 101(1)(g)
61 Reg 47  See GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31-05-2006
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Determining the exact default charges and reasonable enforcement costs, 
which the debtor must pay as part of the reinstatement requirements, is 
therefore not problematic. It is purely a matter of correct calculation and for 
current purposes requires no further attention.
What is meant by “all amounts that are overdue” may be more contentious, 
since this is the crux of the question as to what the debtor must pay so as to 
reinstate the credit agreement. The matter is complicated because this concept 
is not specifically defined in the Act. The reason that the NCA provides no 
definition for “amounts that are overdue” is probably because it is meant to be 
self-explanatory – but is it?
With regard to a loan that must be repaid in periodical instalments, like 
most home loans, “amounts overdue” refers to monies in arrears – in other 
words, instalments that are not up to date (accumulated interest probably 
qualifies as well). Section 129(3) entails that, if all such payments are brought 
up to date, the agreement is reinstated and the creditor can no longer rely 
on default as a ground to cancel the agreement and continue (or commence) 
debt enforcement proceedings. In cases where the enforcement of acceleration 
clauses usually causes the full outstanding debt to become immediately due 
and payable, reinstatement effectively reverses or prevents the creditor’s 
election to accelerate payment of the debt. Section 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd) reinforces 
this point by providing – as explained in part 4 1 above – that the court may 
not even determine the matter if the debtor brought “payments under the 
credit agreement up to date” before court proceedings have been commenced. 
Therefore, the creditor’s decision to cancel the agreement and accelerate 
repayment of the loan would be unenforceable in court. In what follows I 
consider whether the same is true in cases where creditors rely on acceleration 
clauses in the mortgage foreclosure context.
5 2  Can reinstatement reverse foreclosure?
As argued in part 4 3 above, even after commencement of court proceedings 
but before sale of the property (or otherwise executed), payment of the arrears 
will result in reinstatement. However, an important issue to address is whether 
reinstatement applies in acceleration and foreclosure circumstances. The 
reason this question arises is that a mortgage creditor who claims foreclosure 
normally claims the accelerated full outstanding debt. Although it is not 
unknown in South African law to restrict creditors’ powers under acceleration 
clauses,62 acceleration in the context of mortgage foreclosure has not been 
regulated very extensively. Consumer credit legislation prior to the NCA 
did not allow debtors to prevent mortgage foreclosure by rectifying only the 
arrears. In fact, the mortgage creditor is traditionally entitled to refuse late 
payment of amounts in arrears and go ahead with foreclosure. As explained 
62 For credit agreements that fell under the ambit of the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, s 12 provided a 
right of redemption, in terms of which the returned goods could be redeemed by, amongst others, getting 
the amount in arrears up to date: See Otto National Credit Act 98
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in part 2 above, foreclosure could only be prevented in terms of the common 
law right of redemption – in other words, by paying the full outstanding debt.
Concerning the reinstatement of a credit agreement where the full 
outstanding debt had been accelerated and the bond foreclosed on, the court 
in Fraser accepted that getting the actual amount of the default up to date will 
in fact undo foreclosure and consequently reinstate the mortgage agreement.63 
This point of view seemed to make sense, especially because it provided a 
solution to the type of problem brought to light in the Ntsane case.64 However, 
the court in Dwenga raised some doubts as to how reinstatement should 
function in mortgage foreclosure circumstances.65
The immense value of and need for a right of reinstatement in mortgage 
foreclosure cases is illustrated by the facts in Ntsane, which was decided 
before the NCA came into effect. As a result of accelerating repayment of 
the outstanding mortgage debt, the bank in Ntsane claimed a judgment order 
for R62,042.43. Since the debtors would not have been able to satisfy this 
claim and because there was no alternative way to settle the debt, the bank 
also requested an order declaring their mortgaged home specially executable. 
Because the amount claimed was not extraordinarily small, the case appeared 
to comply with the principles set out in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v 
Stoltz66 (“Jaftha”) and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson67 
(“Saunderson”) – the most important cases on this issue decided up until that 
point.
However, what made Ntsane unique was the fact that the actual amount 
outstanding on the day that the case was heard was only R18.46. Without 
going into the details on how Ntsane was decided,68 the court ultimately 
refused to grant a judgment for the accelerated debt of R62,042.43 even 
though the bank was contractually entitled to obtain an order for this amount. 
Instead, the court granted an order for the outstanding arrears of R18.46. 
In summary, although the court acknowledged that the bank’s claim for 
R62,042.43 was undoubtedly lawful, it denied the claim for equitable reasons 
that were strongly informed by the Constitution’s housing clause69 and 
because it regarded the bank’s foreclosure action as an abuse of the process.70 
Despite some doctrinal concerns (traditionally speaking, at least)71 with this 
approach, it is not difficult to understand why the court simply could not allow 
the debtors to lose their home because they were in arrears with only R18.46. 
Options such as debt review and debt rearrangement were not available at that 
point in time. If the debtors had a right of reinstatement then, simply paying 
63 Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ)
64 ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane 2007 3 SA 554 (T)
65 Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) 
SAFLII
66 2005 2 SA 140 (CC)
67 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA)
68 For more details on the case, see Brits Mortgage Foreclosure para 4 4 3 2; L Steyn “‘Safe as Houses’? – 
Balancing a Mortgagee’s Security Interest with a Homeowner’s Security of Tenure” (2007) 11 LDD 101 
109-113
69 S 26 of the Constitution
70 See especially ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane 2007 3 SA 554 (T) paras 85-94
71 See the criticism in Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) paras 32-37
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R18.46 (plus the permitted charges) would have been an easy solution to solve 
the problem – that is, if reinstatement can reverse foreclosure. But in light of 
housing considerations, the possibility of reinstatement is clearly favourable. 
As the court in Dwenga later conceded (despite its discomfort with allowing 
reinstatement to reverse foreclosure), reinstatement is “the beacon … that 
keeps the hope alive” for debtors who wish to “weather the hard times and 
keep their homes, and dignity”.72
After the NCA came into effect, the court in Fraser made some comments 
with respect to how Ntsane was decided and the court specifically dealt 
with the right to reinstate credit agreements in the mortgage context. Of 
significance for current purposes, the court unequivocally accepted that 
getting the amounts outstanding (the arrears) up to date will reinstate the 
credit agreement and therefore overturn foreclosure. The court also compared 
the right of reinstatement with the common law right of redemption and held 
that they are analogous, except that redemption requires payment of the full 
outstanding debt, whereas reinstatement can occur by getting only the arrears 
up to date.73 Accordingly, when the debtor pays the amounts required by 
section 129(3), the attached property will be redeemed (set free) from the sale-
in-execution process and will return to the debtor’s possession. However, the 
mortgage is of course still in effect and the mortgage agreement will continue 
to operate as it did prior to default.
This approach to the right of reinstatement in the mortgage context was 
nonetheless put into question by the court in Dwenga.74 In Dwenga the court 
allowed reinstatement to reverse foreclosure, but only because the creditor did 
not indicate in the notice of default that it was foreclosing the bond. The court 
therefore wondered how the case would have been decided if the creditor had 
expressly warned the debtor of its decision to accelerate repayment of the full 
debt and institute foreclosure proceedings. Notwithstanding that these doubts 
were obiter (since the facts did not necessitate a decision in this respect), this 
is a vital question that needs to be settled so as to ensure certainty in practice.
In my view, the position taken in Fraser is correct. There is nothing in 
the wording of the reinstatement provisions that indicates that Dwenga’s 
obiter doubts are founded. If truth be told, the NCA plainly implies that 
reinstatement will also operate in foreclosure cases. The concept of “all 
amounts that are overdue”75 clearly refers to the amounts in arrears and not 
the accelerated outstanding debt. Also, bringing “payments… up to date”76 
indicates purging the arrears. Furthermore, this interpretation finds support 
in simple logic. If it was necessary to pay the full outstanding debt to reinstate 
a foreclosed mortgage agreement, paying such amounts would not reinstate 
the agreement at all. Rather, payment would simply mean that the full debt is 
72 Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) SAFLII 
para 35 n 36 per Hartle J
73 See Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) paras 39-42
74 Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) SAFLII 
para 35 n 36 per Hartle J
75 S 129(3)(a) of the NCA
76 S 130(3)(c)(ii)(dd)
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paid off and that the contractual relationship has come to an end. The right 
to reinstate would then also add nothing more to the law than what the right 
of redemption already provides. Nevertheless, although the court in Dwenga 
seemed to prefer this reading (based on the traditional principles surrounding 
acceleration clauses), it also pointed to the fact that this interpretation conflicts 
with the purposes of the NCA:
“It does not appear to me to be proper that the consumer is at the mercy of a mortgagee who can 
decide at whim after it has sought to rely on the acceleration clause whether to indulge him or not by 
accepting instalments and holding off execution for as long as it feels so inclined.”77
The court commented further that this state of affairs would not fall inside 
the ambit and structures of the NCA and that it would render the debtor without 
the protection that the NCA provides.78 As the court in Dwenga admitted, 
the restrictive construction of the right of reinstatement in foreclosure cases 
would render it useless for debtors who wish to save their homes.79 Hence, 
it seems to me that the court in Dwenga was itself not so convinced of its 
obiter comments. For example, earlier in the judgment the court held that, 
though an acceleration clause is valid, “the principal obligation to which it is 
accessory – which is in the nature of a credit agreement – must necessarily 
yield to the relevant provisions of the NCA pertaining to the enforcement of the 
foreclosure remedy which avails the mortgagee in the case of the mortgagor’s 
default under the bond”.80
Therefore, the court recognised that the principles surrounding foreclosure 
must yield to the NCA. As far as the common law principles of acceleration 
clauses are incompatible with the NCA’s right of reinstatement, the common 
law must be seen as having been amended. One can accordingly conclude 
that reinstatement is possible in the mortgage context and that foreclosure 
will be prevented and reversed if the debtor purges the default (along with the 
permitted charges). However, reinstatement can only occur up until the point 
that the auction sale is concluded.81 After this point, and up until registration 
takes place, only redemption (paying the full outstanding debt) can save the 
debtor’s home.
6  Conclusion
The provisions that regulate the right of reinstatement once again display 
the poor drafting of the NCA. The interpretational confusion that I have 
attempted to make sense of in this contribution should have been unnecessary, 
since a right of reinstatement can be structured in a much simpler and clearer 
way. Nonetheless, as with other aspects of the NCA, one must make do with 
what is available and find some workable interpretation of the mechanism in 
question.
77 Dwenga v FirstRand Bank Ltd (EL 298/11, ECD 298/11) 2011 ZAECELLC 13 (29 November 2011) SAFLII 
para 35 n 36 per Hartle J
78 Para 35 n 36
79 Para 35 n 36
80 Para 21 per Hartle J
81 See part 4 3 above
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To summarise the operation of the right of reinstatement in the mortgage 
foreclosure context, it appears that the idea behind reinstatement is that 
the enforcement of a credit agreement should not go ahead if the amounts 
outstanding have been brought up to date, despite the creditor’s reliance on 
the acceleration clause. Attached property should also be returned to the 
debtor’s possession. Debt enforcement can however not be prevented when 
the property that is subject to the credit agreement has been sold. At this stage 
enforcement would have gone too far for reinstatement to take place, even if 
the required amounts are paid up.
In the mortgage context the right of reinstatement is of significant value. It 
provides a way for homeowners who default on their home loans to prevent 
the full effects of foreclosure. If they can get the outstanding amounts up to 
date, the NCA guarantees that enforcement of the mortgage agreement will 
be prevented and that their homes will not be sold. As the court in Fraser 
recommended (correctly in my opinion), debtors should be advised of their 
right to reinstate the credit agreement. This advice should be given along with 
the order that declares the property executable.82 The result is that in cases 
where the size of the accelerated debt justifies sale in execution (in terms 
of Jaftha,83 Saunderson84 and Gundwana v Steko Development Gundwana)85 
but the amount of the actual default seems relatively small (as in Ntsane, 
for example), the execution order should still be granted, since this is what 
the bank is entitled to in terms of trite mortgage principles. However, the 
debtor should be encouraged to make use of the right of reinstatement by, for 
instance, liquidating other assets to get the arrears up to date. Although this 
contribution did not address the debt review option, the court can of course 
also deem the particular case worthy of referral to a debt counsellor before 
going forward with full debt enforcement.86
In conclusion, role players in the credit market should take cognisance of 
the right of reinstatement and make use of it where applicable. Courts and 
debt counsellors should advise and encourage debtors in default to make 
use of this right, especially where homes are at stake. Banks should also 
develop their systems to take account of the fact that debt enforcement will 
be prevented by lawful reinstatement in terms of the NCA. The possibility of 
reinstatement may even provide an incentive for mortgage creditors to wait 
for arrears to accumulate before instituting foreclosure action, since the risk 
of reinstatement would become less as the size of the default increases.87
The right of reinstatement is a favourable development in South African 
credit law, as it does not overthrow creditors’ proprietary entitlements in 
82 Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) para 42
83 2005 2 SA 140 (CC)
84 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA)
85 2011 3 SA 608 (CC)
86 S 85 of the NCA
87 If the commendable attitude of the mortgage creditor in ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) is 
anything to go by (see particularly paras 10-16), it appears that the major financial institutions are already 
very accommodating and rarely resort to debt enforcement action before debtors are behind with at least 
two or three months’ instalments  They also appear to do everything that is within their power to prevent 
legal enforcement of credit agreements
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terms of the limited real right of mortgage, but it provides much needed 
consumer protection to enable home-owning debtors to save their homes if 
at all financially possible. Through this mechanism (as well as through the 
other debt relief remedies), the Act finds a more equitable balance – than 
pre-NCA at least – between mortgage creditors’ proprietary security rights 
in hypothecated homes and the constitutional imperative to respect peoples’ 
access to adequate housing.
SUMMARY
Section 129(3) and (4) of the National Credit Act provides debtors who are in default with their 
credit agreements with the right to reinstate such agreements by paying the actual amounts that are 
overdue as well as permitted default charges and enforcement costs. Particularly in the mortgage 
foreclosure context, this mechanism provides relief for credit consumers and it might just be the last 
opportunity for mortgage debtors to save their homes. Mortgagees are traditionally entitled to refuse 
the late payment of home loan instalments and therefore to continue with foreclosure, the result being 
sale in execution of the home. However, the Act has changed this state of affairs and now allows debtors 
to prevent and even reverse the creditor’s election to foreclose by complying with the requirements for 
reinstatement. Therefore, the operation of acceleration clauses is now qualified by the principles of 
reinstatement. It is possible to reinstate the mortgage agreement after judgment has been granted, and 
even after the property has been declared specially executable and attached. However, from the point 
that the property is sold at the auction, reinstatement is no longer possible. The result of reinstatement 
is that the attached property is released from the execution process and returned to the debtor. The 
credit agreement will continue to operate as it did prior to default.
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